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Abstract
This article looks into the night lights of North Korea and their relationship to prosperity shining.
The first  introductory section discusses  the political  economy of  North Korea.  It  highlights  its
strengths and shortcomings. The second section introduces to new methods of geo-spatial micro and
macro econometric analysis. The following night lights analysis is based on near real-time big data.
It includes high-resolution remote-sensing and satellite imagery from the NASA (Earth Obervatory)
Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on the Suomi NPP satellite. The third
and  fourth  section  addresses  important  issues  related  to  North  Korea's  prices,  co-optation  and
mobilization of anger. The final section deal with problems in public policy administration. 
Keywords:  North  Korea,  Varieties  of  Capitalism,  Night  Lights,  Satellite  Imagery,  Political
Economy, public policy administration, buyngjing line.
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Introduction: The Political Economy of North Korea 
North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK) is characterized by a military-
intensive political economy with associated form of capitalism. The  buyngjing line introduced in
2013  coupled  policies  aimed  at  nuclear  development  with  socio-economic  growth  programs
(Haggard 2017, p.4). The path-breaking work of Hall and Soskice (2001) on Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) identifies crucial institutional complementarities of the capitalist system, as well as important
comparative institutional advantages, which affect system stability or change (Hall 2006). These, in
turn,  shed light on the economic vulnerabilities that  each different  variety of capitalism entails
(Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). 
The communist apparatus and the military-industrial complex of North Korea is the key driver of
what can be described a State-Interfered Planned Market Economy, in which political and military
elites  not  only capture  resources  but  also  redistribute  benefits  among  the  population  (see  also
Cerami and Stubbs 2013). As in the United States, military investments and spending determine the
contemporary foreign policy of the country, resulting in an escalating “nuclear race agenda-setting”.
Similarly to the case of the USA-Soviet Union space race of the 1960s, these are expensive political
exercises that in some way have to be financed. Funds can only be raised at this point either from a
reduction in expenditures for those policies indirectly aimed at subsidizing the economy and, hence,
at raising living standards (such as price subsidies or subvention to modernize the firms) or, as last
resort, from an increase in trade or external debt. The latter is, clearly, no more a feasible option
because of  embargos. The third and the last remaining option has therefore been a continuous
increase in military production and exports, as well as a realignment towards new trade partners,
notably China, the Russian Federation and associated new satellite states. 
Beside human development shortcomings, the systemic problems present in North Korea can be
summarized into six main groups: 
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 presence of not fully developed infrastructures (such as in the electricity sector);
 oil-dependence; 
 reduced export-led and import-led growth opportunities; 
  shortcomings in the correct exploitation and redistribution of resources; 
 persistence  of  bad  governance  and,  in  particular,  of  military-political  capture;  and,  as
mentioned,
 a military-spending foreign-dependent based economy. 
A recent report by the Bank of South Korea (2017), has shown in 2016: 1) a real annual GDP
growth of 3.9 percent; 2) an increase in agriculture, forestry and fishing sector by 2.5 percent; 3) a
rise in mining production by 8.4 percent; 4) an expansion in electricity, gas and water production by
22.3 percent; 5) a growth in building construction and civil engineering by 1.2 percent; and 6) a
gain in the services sector by 0.6 percent (see Noland 2017; see also Table 1 and Table 2). As argued
in the report, "bilateral trade between South and North Korea decreased by 87.7 percent year-on-
year  to  record  0.33  billion  dollars  in  2016",  whilst  the  China-North  Korea  trade  in  2015
corresponded to approximately 80 percent of total trade. 
As  a  translation  of  the Korean  Trade  Investment  Promotion  Agency  (KOTRA) Report  shows,
providing adjusted and revised data, from 2014 to 2016, North Korea’s trade exports increased by 4
percent (from $3,164.6 million in 2014 to $2,820.9 million in 2016. Imports grew by 4 percent
(from $4,446.2 in 2014 to $3,725.7 million in 2016. In 2016, North Korea had, however, a negative
trade  balance  of  -5.4  percent  ($-904,786,000 USD in 2016).  North Korea’s  export  with  China
increased from $582,521,000 in 2007 to $2,634,402,000 in 2016. But its imports  overcame the
exports, increasing from $1,392,453,000 in 2007 to $3,422,035,000 in 2016. In 2016, North Korea’s
top  trading  partners  were  China,  Russia,  India,  Thailand,  Philippines,  Pakistan,  Luxembourg,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka (see Boydston 2017). 
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According to calculations made by MIT researchers (2018), in 2015, North Korea’s main exports
consisted of coal briquettes, non-knit men’s coats, non-knit men’s suits, non-knit women’s coats,
and non-knit women’s suits. Sea-fishes and molluscs also figured prominently in the list of exports.
Imports consisted, instead, of refined petroleum, synthetic filament yarn wozen, delivery trucks,
soybean oil and broadcasting equipment.  
The dollarization and (Chinese  Yuan) Renminbization of the economy (see  Park 2017, p.67) has
resulted  in  unprecendeted  growth,  but  it  has  also created serious  vulnerabilities  because of  the
embargo with associated human and health costs. Similarly, military spending in 2014 corresponded
to 24 percent of GDP (USD 2016), though its real volume in 2016 is likely to have increased due to
the "nuclear space race". 
As  Haggard (2017) has argued, North Korea has undergone a “marketization from below” which
has seen the development of private initiative and some lessening of government involvement. This,
however, has occurred in a state-interfered and still planned market economy. The development of
formal General Markets side by side to a growth of the informal jangmadang has slowly gone out
of state control. It involves a variety of market segments, among which consumer goods, services,
real estate, financial services, etc. (Haggard 2017, p. 7). 
As the report by Daily NK (2017) has shown, there are approximately 612,661 stalls across all
General Markets over a population of 24,851,267, distributed in 66 urban areas, 147 counties, 66
districts and three larger districts.  Competition between state and private providers has emerged
(Park 2017, p.22, 44). 
It is important to note that North Korea is highly dependent on oil and gas imports, as well as on the
exports  of  consumer  goods  and  military  equipments.  As Nölke  and  Vliegenthart (2009)  have
argued for the case of former communist countries in Europe, North Korea can be described as a
‘dependent market economy’. Taking into account also Hall's (2017) work on the demand-led and
supply-side  led  economies  of  Europe,  North  Korea  is  characterized  by  three  dangerously
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contrasting  political  economy  models  with  associated  institutional  complementarities and
comparative institutional dis/advantages: 
(1) a military-led political economy dependent on exports in the industrial-military complex;
(2) an import-led political economy dependent on the imports of oil and gas and/or other socio-
technical  advancement  equipments  (such  as  bio-technologies  in  the  health  care  or
agricultural sector) (see Haggard and Noland 2017); and 
(3) export-led political economy dependent on the exports of certain goods (such as minerals,
textiles, agricultural and fishery products ).
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
Needless  to  say,  should  a  system  transformation  occur,  a  dramatic  change  in  the  strategic
coordination of labor and wages (see also Kollmorgen et al. 2015; and Dolata 2013), as well as in
trade realignment, becomes necessary. This also implies the emergence of new social classes. For
example, the Donju (money masters) (Park 2017, p.57) are the North Korean nouveaux riches, who
can  be  compared  to  the  oligarchs  of  the  Russian  Federation:  individuals  who  acquire  a
disproportionate amount of wealth and therefore are able to pursue both private income-generating
and foreign policy objectives. 
North  Korea  is  a  coastal  and  could  be  a high  opportunity  economy (see  Ndulu  et  al. 2008)
dependent on oil and gas. Its main future trading partners are likely to become China, the Russian
Federation and South Korea, whose realignment will also depend on oil and gas partnerships and
associated dependencies (Ross 2012; Cerami 2013).
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Geo-Spatial Analysis1
In recent  years,  new methods  of  geo-spatial  micro  and macro  econometric  analysis  have  been
developed  based  on  near  real-time  big  data.  These  include  high-resolution NASA  Earth
Observatory remote-sensing  satellite  imagery  where  single  pixels  become  the  smallest  units  of
scientific enquiry. NASA nighttime lights are derived from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer
Suite (VIIRS)2 sensor on the SUOMI NPP satellite3. Data involve the average visible band digital
number  of  cloud-free  light  detections  multiplied  by  the  percent  frequency  of  light  detection.
Variations  are  normalized  so  as  to  avoid  fires  and  background  noises.  A special  algorithm is
developed to remove remaining clouds' and snows' shades.
New ad hoc macro- and micro econometric measures of human, economic and market activity can,
in this way, be obtained. This analysis can provide useful insights on current GDP and GDP growth,
or "True GDP" Growth and the size of the informal economy (Medina and Schneider 2018), current
and future income growth, presence of roads and infrastructures, wealth of cities, urban versus rural
divides, the effects of diseases on growth (such as malaria), growth at the coast versus the interior.
Computer-based  satellite  imagery  analysis  can  also  be  useful  to  natural  resource  discovery,
pollution, as well as in identifying building types, agricultural land use, monitoring climate and
weather,  etc.  (see Henderson  et  al.  2012; Donaldson  and  Storeygard  2016; Leitzell  2012).  For
Letizell (2012), nighttime lights ccan here be understood as a proxy of economic prosperity and
shining  , which can be defined as   “the condition of being successful or thriving, especially with
reference to economic well-being4. The night time light photos incorporate, therefore, a huge variety
of human, economic, trade and development information. Light shining is also a scene of human
1 A more detailed geo-spatial  analysis  with interactive graphs and images is  available at  Story
Maps: Geo-Spatial Analysis North Korea https://arcg.is/0vrrje
2 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
3 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/
4 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prosperity
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action, economicable and bankable human activity, human and economic dynamism, vitality and
vibrance,  socio-technical  advancement,  “net  progress”,  and  human  socialization.  For  example,
investigating how energy consumption behaviors vary across different cultural settings, Román and
Stokes (2015) have succeeded to shed new light on the cultural patterns according to which cities
and “people illuminate the night” and their life (such as during he Christmas and New Year’s season
and the Holy  Month of Ramadan). The number and the intensity of lights is, in fact, very often
associated to the wealth of a city and of a nation (think, for example, to Paris or New York night
lights).
Over  the  period  1992-2011,  analysis  by Leitzell  (2012) and Haggard  and Pope (2014a,b,c)  on
luminosity changes has shown the existence of huge intra-country regional disparities, urban-rural
divides, and inbalances in city lights per capita. 
More recent analysis similarly shows that huge differences between South Korea and North Korea
persist over the period 2012-2018. Seoul’s night lights shine, though to a lesser extent than before.
Night lights development ("True" GDP development) in Pyongyang lags behind (see almost not-
visible  shining  point  north  of  Seoul).  From  March  2017  to  March  2018,  prosperity  shining
decreased in South Korea and and continued to decrease in North Korea as a result of the "nuclear
space race". 
More in details, between 2012 and 2016, Pyongyang slightly expanded its prosperity shining in the
centre of the city, though this happened at the expenses of the neighboring areas (see Fig. 1 and Fig.
2). This was caused by new real-estate investments for cadres in the centre of the city (the so-called
The  Pyonghattan  project).  From March  2017  to  March  2018,  prosperity  shining  continued  to
decrease in Pyongyang from 248.2 sq KM in March 2017 to 136.9 sq KM in March 2018. The
zones of highest prosperity shining decreased from 60 sq KM in 2017 to 1.5 sq KM in March 2018. 
The main human and economic activity remained concentrated in the centre of the city. Embargo
and reduced trade activity were the main causes for this decrease in “True” GDP.
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[Fig, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 6, 6a, 7, 7a, 8, 8a about here]
More  in-depth  geo-spatial  macro  and micro-  econometric  analysis  on  local  human and  market
activity  highlight  the  different  levels  of  economic  growth:  national,  regional  and  local  (more
detailed  analysis  with  interactive  graphs  and  images  is  available  at  Story  Maps:  Geo-Spatial
Analysis North Korea https://arcg.is/0vrrje). It also shows that city development policies must take
into  account  different  neighborhood’s  development  lights  of  human and market  activities,  with
associated prosperity shining and shortcomings. The cost of living in Pyongyang, as of October 12,
2017, is exponentially rising. A monthly rent for 85 m2 in a normal area is about 2,800,000 KPW
($1 is about 8,000 KPW), whilst in an expensive area is equal to 4,213,490 KPW. 1 liter of fat milk
392 KPW. 12 eggs large 790 KPW. 500 grams of local cheese 4,460 KPW. 1 bottle of red table wine
(good quality) 2,009 KPW. Bread (not brioches) for 2 people for 1 day 356 KPW. 1 month internet
(8 Mbps) 49,300 KPW. 40” flat screen TV 100,000 KPW. 1 summer dress in high street store (Zara,
etc.) 67,790 KPW. 1 liter of gas 786 KPW. 1 Volkswagen Golf 1.4 TSI 150 CV (or equivalent)
36,000,000 KPW. 1 Monthly ticket public transport 54,042 KPW. 1 box of antibiotics (12 doses)
50,868 KPW. 4 rolls of toilet paper 3,103 KPW (Source: Expatistan.com 20175). 
Ageing Population and the Politics of Mortality
Because  of  ongoing  and  complex  processes  of  political,  economic,  cultural  and  societal
restructuring,  where new social  risks emerge (Armingeon and Bonoli  2006),  the challenges for
North Korea are even more serious and pressing than the ones that other Western nations are called
upon to face.  North Korea is  not  only confronted with similar  demographic pressures  as  other
Western societies are  (such as ageing population).  It  is  also forced to deal  with more dramatic
systemic problems. They stem, on the one hand, from the transition from a centrally planned to a
5 https://www.expatistan.com/cost-of-living
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mixed-market  economy.  On the other,  they derive from the negative occurences  that  the North
Korean population is called upon to deal with the negative occurences because of war and nuclear
proliferation activities. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (see Linz and Stepan
1996; also O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986) become here more pressing. 
The North Korean society is ageing. According to the United Nations (UN) Population Division
(2017) (see Figure 9),  the number of people aged 65 and above will  double by 2050, and will
continue to rise until 2100. 
Figure 9 Total Population by broad age group 
[Fig. 9 about here]
Low birth  rates  associated  with  an  increase  in  life  expectancy are  the  major  causes  for  these
demographic  developments.  North  Korea  is  expected  to  witness  a  constant  increase  in  life
expectancy followed by decrease in the number of births (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). 
Figure 10 Life expectancy at birth by sex 
[Fig. 10 about here]
[Fig. 11 about here]
As shown in  Figure  12,  these  societal  changes  have  important  repercussions  for  public  policy
making. Different population pyramids need different policy responses. Needless to say, this has
also important consequences in terms of politics of inequality (Cerami 2013),  politics of anger
management (Cerami 2015), as well as the associated distributive conflicts (Haggard and Kaufman
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2008, 2016). 
Figure 12 Population Pyramids 
[Fig. 12 about here]
As shown in Fig. 13, after a significant decrease in the deaths between the period 1950 to 1990, the
crude death rate of the North Korean population is expected to grow until 2100. However, this
trend, already negative, does not fully take into account future amenities of war and of nuclear
proliferation, such as those linked to famine and the increase in war-related fatalities and illnesses. 
Fig. 13 Crude Death Rate North Korea 1950-2100
[Fig. 13 about here]
A recent article in The Lancet, one of the world’s leading medical journals, has highlighted that
rapid  mass  privatization  has  been one  of  the  most  crucial  determinants  of  differences  in  adult
mortality trends in post-communist  countries,  accounting for up to 1 million lives.  The authors
(Stuckler, King, & McKee, 2009) have explained the main reason for this increase in mortality rates
as caused by the captured nature of privatized resources by oligarchs (see also Novokmet et al.
2017) and by other former communist party members (including their sons). Though real mortality
rates remained often a state secret during communism (Vlassov and Vishnevsky 2017), the captured
nature of resources has fostered further stages of political and administrative corruption. This has
led to the re-emergence of different mafia organizations, with a subsequent increase in inequality
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and mortality rates.
Interestingly, the negative effects of rapid privatization were reduced if the social capital of citizens
was high. This was clearly the case of former members of the communist elites. Notwithstanding,
when more than 45 per cent of the population affected by rapid mass privatization was part of at
least  one  social  organization,  such  as  church  or  trade  union,  privatization  was  no  longer
significantly associated with increased mortality rates (Stuckler,  King and McKee,  2009).  Slow
privatization also helped to reduce mortality rates and vulnerabilities (Azarova et al. 2017). Who are
then the real winners of contemporary North Korea’s buyngjing line?
Prices, Co-optation and the Mobilization of Anger
The 2017 nuclear missile ballistic crisis has done nothing more than crystallizing already existing
systemic  problems.  The  prolonged  drought  of  2017,  coupled  with  a  slow  increase  in  cereal
production since the fall of 1988-2001 (FAO 2017), has resulted in a subsequent growth in food
prices (see also Haggard and Noland 2007). This was followed by a set of new sanctions by the
international  community,  which  aimed  at  stopping  the  nuclear  proliferation  aspirations  of  Kim
Jong-un's North Korea. In order to limit the possible explosion of anger among the population, the
North Korean regime introduced a set of price stabilizing measures, as well as increased repression
for the illegal trade of goods. 
What kind of social pacifying strategies (divide and conquer, divide and pacify, unify and conquer
and unify and pacify, see Cerami 2013) has the North Korean regime implemented in order to calm
the  masses?  This  raises  questions  of  how the  dissent  voices of  citizens  could  be  successfully
reduced by the regime through redistributive social policies so as to increase their  loyalty to the
system and, thus, limiting their  options for  exit and protest  (Hirschman 1970, 1978). As another
journalist of the Daily NK has ascertained, "As fuel prices have been fluctuating, gasoline coupons
have become popular items in Pyongyang's black markets. The merchants who previously bought
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dozens of coupons have started offering them for sale  as the prices  began to rise” (Ah 2017).
Interesting to note here is that coupons were initially issued by the central government, but also
foreign currency enterprises can also do it. They were mostly delivered to high ranking officials and
members  of  the  cadres  and  could  also  be  used  in  restaurants,  resold  in  the  black  market  or
exchanged for dollars (Ah 2017). 
The  absence  of  clear  social  pacifying  strategy of  the  regime  (unify  and  conquer)  might  have
resulted in anger among the cadres, which could then have potentially crossed national borders and
territories, representing a threat to regime stability. In order to avoid this, the North Korean regime
implemented  a  stricter  control  over  the  system  of  coupons,  introducing  a  «politics  of  de-
mobilization of anger» (Ost 2009) centered on the co-optation of cadres. In the eyes of the regime,
this should also have resulted in the indirect co-optation of citizens. However, strange circles of
semi-loyalty around the leader were created. 
When  introducing  strategies  of  social  cooptation,  a  particular  attention  should  be  given  to
unintended consequences. Dividing the masses can result in events impossible to predict, such as
formation  of  new elites  and  clienteles,  unexpected  civil  riots,  insurgencies,  deaths  of  innocent
people, etc. (anonymous source). As aptly described by Svolik (2011, p.1), ‘after a transition to
democracy, politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics
of  those  who  see  this  period  as  their  “one-time  opportunity  to  get  rich.”  After  repeatedly
disappointing  government  performance,  voters  may  come  to  believe  that  “all  politicians  are
crooks,” stop discriminating among them, to which politicians rationally respond by “acting like
crooks”’.  Svolik  calls  such  an  expectation-driven  social  mechanism  the  ‘trap  of  pessimistic
expectations’, whose consequences for the democratization process, as well as for the consolidation
of democratic institutions can be disastrous.
As discussed elsewhere (see Cerami 2013,  esp.  ch.  9  and ch.  10),  poverty and the increase in
vertical and horizontal inequalities can be addressed as the primary causes of civil conflicts, but this
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tells us nothing about how these driving forces turn into practical results. It becomes immediately
evident that the North Korean regime has seen in the absence of social protection a key social
transmission mechanism of protest. When the first concessions became insufficient to pacify the
masses, as it happened during the Arab revolts (Cerami 2015), police and military repression mostly
follows.  Whilst   in  my previous  book I  discussed  “The Exclusive  Origins  of  Dictatorship  and
Democracy”  (Cerami  2013),  I  did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  “The  Inclusive  Origins  of
Dictatorship and Democracy”. 
Co-optation – broadly understood as  the capacity of the ruling elite to bind strategic actors via
formal and informal institutions - becomes, in this context, an important mechanism of institutional
maintenance  (Cerami  2013,  p.194;  Merkel  and  Gerschewski  2011).  Commonly  employed  by
authoritarian leaders in the Middle East (Joshua 2011) to substitute democratic participation by
ensuring the inclusion of strategically important parts of the population into politics, co-optation is
more  often  applied  to  the  case  of  North  Korea,  especially  for  those  citizens  belonging  to  the
industrial-military complex and the foreign currency earning enterprises. When transactions occur
in  non-democratic  settings,  these  usually  take  place  on  an  open  do  ut  des  basis  between  the
autocrats and their ‘clients’, leading to sub-optimal results (Svolik 2012). 
To provide some more clearer examples (see Cerami 2013, pp. 94-96), there are several institutional
and social mechanisms of differential inclusion and exclusion that can simultaneously foster the
emergence and consolidation of both dictatorships and democracies. A first set of institutional and
social mechanisms responsible for hindering poverty-reduction and the overall human development
goals in the country had to do with the inheritance of status inequality. By restricting the chances for
successful  institutional  and  social  interactions  (such  as  social  mechanisms  of  boundary  de-
activation and de-brokerage; see MacAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), the inheritance of
status  inequality  limits,  through  institutional  lock-in  and  self-reinforcing  mechanisms,  the
possibility of autonomous self-advancement of the population. 
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A second set of institutional and social mechanisms is related to the issue of lost childhood and the
need to invest in children and youths. As Esping-Andersen (2008) has shown, if not sufficiently
addressed by adequate political, economic and welfare institutions, the impact of social origins on
child  outcomes  tends  to  persist,  greatly  affecting  the  chances  of  the  economic  and  social
development of a society. 
A third set of institutional and social mechanisms of inequality reproduction is concerned with the
cyclicity  of  poverty.  Through  a  self-sustaining  and  self-reinforcing  institutional  mechanism  of
exclusion, poverty reduces the chances of the affected from accessing the most valuable resources,
often elitist institutions, such as good schools, universities, centers of excellence, better equipped
hospitals, safe neighborhoods and so on (Petersen 2009). 
A fourth set  of institutional  and social  mechanisms is  associated with the presence of negative
cultural, ethnic or religious repertoires with particular reference to those that hindered access to key
positions by excluding individuals based on class, gender, race or ethnic origin. Sociological studies
within this topic are innumerable and a list of the most important articles or even books would fill
several hundred pages (see Cerami 2013). 
A final set of institutional and social mechanisms of exclusion concerned the access to political
power and associated local governance dynamics (Ostrom 1990, 2005). Excluding poor people from
education in the best universities implied not simply having less access to the labour market but also
having  fewer  chances  to  access  political  positions  in  democratic  ways.  Clearly,  when  all
institutional  doors  were  closed  by the  elites,  poor  people  turned  to  political  mobilization  and
eventually to violence to ensure the representation of their interests and access to the few power
positions available (Justino 2010).
In this context, a correct understanding of the facilitators of democratization becomes particularly
important,  especially  in  presence  of  state  fragility  where  conflict,  low  development  status,
vulnerability to endogenous and exogenous threats, and the lack of a developmental state capable of
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addressing the emerging socio-economic problems in a consistent way are the key characteristics.
The costs associated to the existence of ‘fragile’ states are enormous and can affect the economic
development and system stabilization possibilities of the countries for several years to come (Naudé
et  al 2011).  Here,  despite  the  persistence  of  some shortcomings,  aid  for  democracy-enhancing
related projects represents the most important element in democracy promotion (Burnell 2011) and
consolidation (Resnick 2012), as an increasing number of studies have recently and unequivocally
shown.  However,  equally  important  is  to  understand  past  mistakes  made  and  the  problems
associated with past waves of system transformation.
Public Policy Administration and System Transformation in North Korea 
As mentioned, North Korea is a military-based State-Interfered Planned Market Economy, whose
dominant predatory mixed-capitalist mode of production and allocation of resources influences the
leading social relationships. This results in various forms of social segregation and exploitation. A
portfolio of different sources of formal and informal revenue affects the living conditions of the
population subjected to this political economy of war with growing insecurity that is very often
associated to extensive forms of patronage and clientelism. This, subsequently, leads to unexpressed
cadres and social conflicts (see also Gough 2004, Figure 1.3, p.32). North Korean markets are, in
this context, to be seen as social structures (see Beckert  et al. 2007) with unique social-patronage
relations.  As  it  often  happens  in  real-life  situations,  most  of  the  social  interactions  on  money
depend, and on money push (Bergsdorf et al.2007). Government co-optation of civil society greatly
influences the patterns of system transformation.  Coupons for the  cadres,  sexy photos with the
smiling leader,  the monopolization of local market stands,  the introduction of compulsory cash
cards  for  workers,  special  privileges  for  scientists,  and  tolerance  for  oligarchs-like  real  estate
brokers  are  indicators  of  new forms differentiation  and de-differentiation (see  Radio Free  Asia
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea). 
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What pathways of democratic transformation can be envisaged?  While it  is  certainly correct to
affirm that  history  matters in  political,  institutional,  economic,  cultural  and  social  change (see
Pierson 2004), this  does not mean that the patterns of system transformation are already set in
advance, as important institutional and societal adaptations, mutations and evolutions may occur
(Lewis and Steinmo 2012), significantly altering the make-up of a country. A better understanding
of the patterns of system transformation requires also an improved knowledge of the  relationship
that  exists  between fixed-immovable objects  (Pierson 1998) in  the public  policy administration
sphere  and the  dynamic  actions  of  public  policy administrators  (Farrel  and Shalizi  2012).  The
dichotomy between institutions and agency or, if one prefers, between  structure and  agency (see
Giddens 1984) is often misleading (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) when applied to regional settings
(de  Bruijn  et  al 2007),  and,  especially,  when  one  element  is  supposed  to  exclude  the  other
(Katznelson and Milner  2002).  Through a circular  process,  institutions  influence the actions  of
actors, which, in turn, are capable of influencing the patterns of system transformation. The issue at
stake here is if a system transformation in North Korea must occur, how to deal with authoritarian
historical legacies, institutions, ideas and culture (see Kollmorgen et al. 2015). Another important
set of issues is whether democracy can be exported through bombing, and, consequently, whether
abrupt  institutional  change  in  public  policy  administration  is  to  be  preferred  to  gradual  or
evolutionary transformation.
Public Policy Administration and the Governance of War Desire
The  governance  of  war  desire  becomes,  in  this  context,  an  important  factor  for  public  policy
administration  stability  and  change.  Democratization  through  war  is  a  risky endeavor  (Grimm
2015). The responsibility to protect, as defined by the Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State  Sovereignty (2001),  sets  some pre-conditions  necessary for  intervention,
among which the protection of populations from mass murders and genocides. The governance of
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war desire is an additional necessity. 
As mentioned elsewhere (Carmel and Cerami 2011, p.10), “emotions (Elster 1999, 2009a,b) play a
central role in institutional and policy change, favouring the formation of specific beliefs (Rydgren
2009)  and  preferences  (Freese  2009),  which,  in  turn,  structure  the  attitudes  of  citizens  and
institutional agents and, subsequently, limit the set of opportunities available (Petersen 2009). For
Jon Elster (1999, 2007, 2009a,b), the distinction between  rational and  irrational behaviour  is a
trivial  misunderstanding  (see  also  Damasio  1994),  because,  as  Raymond  Boudon  has  also
emphasized (2003), reason is often subjected to emotions, but emotions often rely on reasoning to
crystallize. As argued by Frank (1988), passions often serve our interests in a co-producing and self-
sustaining process of interest-maximizing preference formation and vice versa.
Bombing is expensive for the state budget. It is also a lucrative business. But when no clear idea of
future system transformation pathways exists, it becomes, additionally, a suicidal political exercise6.
Similarly, North Korea's nuclear program has been estimated at $1 billion to $3 billion. According
to CNBC estimations, each “Scud costs between $1 million and $2 million; each Musudan from $3
million to $6 million”. (Source: CNBC 2017). In September 2017, the cost of one kilogram of rice
was around KPW 6,000 that corresponded to approximately $0.75 (exchange rate $1 = 8086 KPW
28.9.2017). This meant North's nuclear program costed between 1 million tons of rice and 4 million
tons  of rice. Each Scud costed between 1.3 thousand tons of rice and 2.6 thousand tons of rice; each
Musudan  from 4  thousand tons  of  rice  and  8  thousand  of  rice;  and  each  submarine-launched
ballistic missile at 6.6 thousand tons of rice and 13.3 thousand tons of rice. Over a total population
of 24,851,267 inhabitants, North Korea's nuclear program, as mentioned before estimated between
$1 billion and $3 billion, corresponded to 54 kilos of rice per capita and 161 kilos of rice per capita.
6 The cost of a  simple US air-to-air  AIM-7 Sparrow missile ranges,  for example,  around US$
150,000 per unit, whilst the RIM-161 standard antiballistic missile 3 (SM-3) costs between US$ 9
and 24 million per unit.
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This, subsequently, corresponded to 150 grams and 450 grams of rice per day for each inhabitant
(see also Daily NK 2017, p.12).  It comes then as no surprise that the patterns of North Korean
inclusion greatly changed after the 2018 unofficial peace talks with South Korea and China during
the winter  Olympics,  since they corresponded to more long-term political  objectives of  system
stability and peace.
Conclusions
Size matters, some claim. Others emphasize the usage.  Contrasting theories. The North Korean
ballistic missile Taepodong 2 is presumably bigger than the Taepodong 1 with a wider scope of
action.  Its real goals,  however,  are still  unclear,  but,  presumably,  they are disastrous for peace-
building. 
In Choice Architecture, 2017 Nobel  Prize Winner  Richard H. Thaler and his colleagues Cass R.
Sunstein, John P. Balz (2014) define the NUDGES approach. It comprises of six main principles for
making good policy choices: iNcentives, Understand mappings, Defaults, Give feedback, Expect
error, and Structure complex choices. iNcentives refers to prices and incentives. More specifically, it
has to do with: who uses, who chooses, who pays, who profits of (and by) a determined policy
choice. Understand mappings concerns the right policy choices that lead to the welfare of society.
This, for example, involves selecting which policies to choose among a wide variety of possible
equally suitable alternatives.  Defaults means avoiding the least  pathway of resistance when this
default option (doing nothing or no change) leads to negative results (Thaler et al. 2014, p. 430). In
complex  systems, Give  feedback is  a  necessary  endeavor  to  avoid  mistakes.  What  rose  the
admiration of baseball fans and gives them joy is often the individual achievements of players. But
the player there does not stand alone at the plate, because s/he is part of a team. Looks, throws,
catches, hustles are all elements part of one big team. Giving feedback to players becomes, in this
context,  necessary to  ensure the consistency of  their  game choices  (anonymous quote).  Expect
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error is a fifth important element in order to improve a policy-maker’s choice architecture. If a
player goes out there for himself/herself without thinking about the team (or caring about the team),
he or she gets nowhere. The team must fit, players must expect errors and learn how to deal with
them. Structure complex choices is hence the sixth and final element of the NUDGES approach. It
involves  the  necessity  of  adopting  different  strategies  for  dealing  with  complex  problems  and
choosing  the  best  alternative  with  more  trade-offs.  Structure  complex  choices  means,  in  brief,
having in mind a structure of alternative suitable strategies.
This  discussion  includes  also  the  ways  in  which  public  policy  administrators  deal  with  the
Descartes’ Error (Damasio 1994) – that is to say – the tensions that exist between their emotions
and ir/rational behaviors. In other words, their Feeling of What Happens (Damasio 2000), as well as
the  desires’ contraints  that  public  policy  actors  face  in  their  everyday  life,  especially  when
socialized  in  determined  institutions.  As Thaler  and  Mullainathan  (2001)  have  correctly
emphasized,  departures  from  pre-existing  ir/rationalities  are  not  rare  (on  path-departures,  see
also Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009; Cerami 2013). In this context, it is not extraordinary to adopt “the
rule of the thumb as a way to economize on cognitive faculties” (Thaler and Mullainathan 2001,
p.3).
In the  case  of  the North Korean public  policy administration diatribe,  the issue  at  stake  is,  to
paraphrase Thaler and Mullainathan (2001, p.2 ), whether it makes sense to follow “dumb money”,
as in the case of nuclear proliferation activities promoted by the industrial-military complex, versus
following “smart money”,  as in the case of ensuring a correct  functioning in  the public policy
domain.
As  mentioned  previously,  the  costs  associated  with  nuclear  proliferation  and  war  escalation
activities  are  enormous,  as  introduced by  the buyngjing line  of  political  economy. These
incalculable costs include political costs, economic costs, cultural costs and social costs that public
policy administrators are called to deal with in some way with limited budget possibilities. The
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relational elective afﬁnities between nuclear proliferation and effective public policy administration
must still be clarified.
To  conclude,  the  ancient  Greeks  had  a  nuanced  conception  of  time:  Cronos referred  to  the
chronological quantification of time and to its sequentiality – or put it simply – of how many hours
have passed. Kairos referred instead to the right or opportune moment, for example, when it is the
right time to speak or to act. In our everyday lives, the “rythm of timing” (Gelang 2013) has to do
with the rythm of “now”.  The feeling of “now” can also be understood in terms of “real-time
impermanence” (Peary 2016), which means occurences at Time 1 (t1) that mutate at Time 2 (t2)
(just  think,  for  example,  to  your  first  kiss  or  to  the  birth  of  a  child). In  the  public  policy
administration domain, timing and sequentiality of reforms (see Pierson 2004) mean for policy-
analysts,  as  well  as  for  public  policy  administrators  exactly  choosing  the  right  moment  to
implement the opportune reforms. It also means having a feeling of what happens, Understanding
the negative incentives, the  mappings (that is- the right policy choices that lead to the welfare of
society), the defaults of these choices, the negative feedbacks, the errors, and the obsolete structure
of complex choices linked to the buyngjing line of political economy remains crucial.
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ANNEX
30
Fig 1 The Night Lights of North Korea 2012
31
Fig 2 The Night Lights of North Korea 2016
Fig 3 The Night Lights of North Korea March 2017
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Fig 4 The Night Lights of North Korea March 2018
34
Fig 5 The Night Lights of Pyongyang 2012
NOTE:  Fig. 5a, Fig. 6a, Fig. 7a, Fig. 8a  display the changes in color luminosity and the single
value of this luminosity plotted in a 3-D environment.  
Fig 5a Color Display Graph Pyongyang 2012
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Fig. 6 The Night Lights of Pyongyang 2016
Fig 6a Color Display Graph Pyongyang 2016
36
Fig. 7 The Night Lights of Pyongyang March 2017
Fig 7a Color Display Graph Pyongyang March 2017
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Fig. 8 The Night Lights of Pyongyang March 2018
Fig 8a Color Display Graph Pyongyang March 2018
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Figure 9 Total Population by broad age group 
[Fig. 9 about here]
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
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Figure 10 Life expectancy at birth by sex 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
Fig. 11 North Korea Number of Births (both sexes)
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
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Figure 12 Population Pyramids 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
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Fig. 13 Crude Death Rate North Korea 1950-2100
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website.
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